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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
the executor-trustee from taking the additional percentage on gross rentals. This
litigation was commenced after the discovery by the trust's life tenant, of a letter
in the hands of the bank written to the settlor of this trust by the bank's chief
trust officer, stating that the bank would accept certain rates for its "services"
as executor-trustee of the settlor's estate. These rates were less than the statutory
minimums and as witfi the will, this letter was silent as to commissions for real
estate management.
The decision rested on the interpretation the Court gave to the word
services' contained in the bank's letter. The Court held that the word 'services'
encompassed both the ordinary administrative duties of the executor-trustee and
the management of the real property, as both duties were services to be performea
by the trustee.
The bank, admittedly knowing of the existence of the letter, had a duty to
show this correspondence to all interested parties.4 9 Its failure to do so, the
improbability of the banks officer consenting to accept reduced commissions
without an idea of the estate's composition, and the fact that the bank could
have refused to qualify as executor-trustee after it had learned of the estate's
contents, led the Court to use its authority to reopen the Surrogate's prior decrees5"
and force the bank to return the rental commissions it had withheld. This case
presents an example of the familiar legal principle that when one of the parties
prepares the wording to an agreement and the meaning of this wording later
comes into dispute, any ambiguity is construed against the maker of the
agreement 5 '

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Bastards: Support Payments By Putative Father
Early this year, the Court of Appeals in rev.-iewing a paternity proceeding
reached the decision that support payments assessed against the father of an
illegitimate child should not be limited by the station in life of the mother but
that the father's financial ability together with the mother's standard of living
should be considered in determining the amount of such payments.' In this case,
the mother's station in life was much inferior to that of the father. The lower
49. In re Bond and Mortgage Guarantee Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721
(1952).
50. N.Y. SURROGATE*S COURT AcT §20(6); In re Short's Will, 229 N.Y. 374,
128 N.E. 225 (1920).
51. Giller v. Bank of America, 160 N.Y. 549, 55 N.E. 292 (1899); Rentways,
Inc. v. O'Neill Milk and Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 126 N.E.2d 271 (1955).
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court, functioning under the New York City Court Act,2 awarded a sum consistent
with the mother's station in life on the assumption that a larger award would
benefit the mother and that such a result was not the purpose of a support award.
The Court of Appeals, though remanding to the lower court for further fact
finding of the father's financial ability agreed with the Appellate Division 3 that the
definition of support in the New York City Court Act §61 (4)4 does not require
that the child suffer from the added burden of a low standard of living when the
father could provide a better one. Although the words "according to the station in
life of the mother" are words of limitation, they are not an absolute limitation.
Furthermore, the Court felt that since the support award could be administered by
a trustee5 a more adequate award would not necessarily increase the mother's
standard of living.
For yeari, the courts have awarded meager support payments in paternity
proceedings on the ground that greater awards would increase mothers' standard of
living,6 or that the father had other dependents for whom to provide.1 Even
when the trial court has made support orders which were more than nominal, the
Appellate Division has reduced them.8 Community demand upon the father to
provide support merely sufficient to prevent the illegitimate from becoming a
public charge was the theory behind these decisions.9 The Court of Appeals,
setting a new precedent, has denied this theory and says, instead, that the child's
welfare is the real purpose of the law of paternity proceedings. There has been
a gradual trend in a few other jurisdictions to order support for illegitimates
according to the father's means. 10 Although this decision does not go so far, it
recognizes that the child's welfare is not served by limiting support to the mother's
station in life regardless of the father's means. Such a standard may be very
harmful to the child born out of wedlock especially if the mother is very poor.
Modern legal writers have long advocated the decision reached by this court"
They realize that it is grossly unjust to treat a child born to unwed parents as
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

N.Y. CITY CouRTs AcT §61(4) provides that:
The word support as used in this article may include (a) the
necessary support and education of the child ... according
to the age of the child and the station In life of its mother
and the financial ability of the parents.
1 A.D.2d 543, 151 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1st Dep't 1956).

Supra note 2.
N.Y. CITY CouRTs ACT §70.
Fowler v. Rizzuto, 205 Misc. 1088, 132 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
People v. Towns, 201 Misc. 322, 115 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
Oertli v. Margulies, 258 App. Div. 952, 17 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1st Dep't 1940);

GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 194-195 (1954).

9. VENIER, IV .AMERICAN LAWS, 218 (1936).
10. James v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 458, 227 S. W. 562 (1921); Fawhead v.
State, 99 Okla. 197, 226 Pac. 376 (1924); Doughdrlll v. Hathorn, 160 Miss. 291,
130 So. 131 (1931).
11. Supra note 9; SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS, 421-424 (3rd
ed. 1953).
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the offspring of illegal and immoral relations instead of as an innocent babe in
need of security and protection. Thus, the standard of support for the illegitimate
child should not be less than that required of the father of the legitimate child.
In the long run, the community will realize greater profit in protecting and
providing for the innocent child than in merely safeguarding the community
charity funds.
This case interprets the New York City Court Act which applies only to the
City of New York.' 2 Under the Domestic Relations Law, concerning paternity
proceedings brought in any other part of the state, support is not narrowly
defined.' 3 Thus the reasoning of the present decision is more readily applicable
to the Domestic Relations Law. With little doubt it can be stated that this
decision has initiated a new trend in higher support payments not only in New
York City but throughout the entire state.
Res Judicata In Matrimonial Actions
In this state, the conclusiveness of judgments is determined by one of two
rules, res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata bars subsequent litigation
based on the same cause of action as to issues which were or could have been
raised in the former proceeding.' 4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents
subsequent litigation on a different cause of action as to issues actually and necessarily determined in the prior proceeding. 15 Thus, the determining factor as to
what rule shall be applied is the similarity or difference between causes of actions
in the two proceedings.
In Statter v. Statter'0 plaintiff, wife, broughtan action for annulment against_
her husband on the basis of facts which she had knowledge of in a prior action
against her for separation but was unable to prove at that time. Judgment in the
separation action was for the husband after the wife admitted the validity of the
marriage due to.her lack of proof to the contrary. The wife's contention, that since
the two causes of action were different and the validity of the marriage had never
been contested, she could maintain this action for annulment, was upheld by the
lower court and the Appellate Division.1T The Court of Appeals' 8 reversed finding
12. Szwarce v. Buenaventura, 301 N.Y. 558, 93 N.E.2d 448 (1950); Hought v.
Light, 275 App. Div. 299, 89 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep't 1949).
13. N. Y. DOMESTIC RELATioNs LAW §120 provides that:
The parents of a child born out of wedlock are liable for the
necessary support and education of the child....
14. Pray v. Hegeman, 33 Hun. 358 (N.Y.- 1885); Matter of N.Y. State Labor
Relations Board v. Holland Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 63 N.E.2d 68 (1954).
15. Smith v. Kirpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1953).
16. 2 N.Y.2d 668, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1957).
17. 2 A.D.2d 81, 153 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1st Dep't 1956).

18. Supra note 16.

